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THE STEP-TRANSACTION DOCTRINE IN SUBCHAPTER C:
THE SEARCH FOR A UNIFYING THEORY CONTINUES
by
ROBERT WILLENS*
INTRODUCTION
p ERHIS THE MOST pervasive principle employed in the application of the
law of taxation is the maxim that the substance, rather than the form
in which a transaction is cast, will govern its tax consequences. Nowhere is
this principle more rigorously adhered to than in Subchapter C of the Internal
Revenue Code - that portion of the Code dealing with corporation distribu-
tions and adjustments. This passion for substantive analysis is exemplified by
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Gregory v. Helvering,' a case in
which a transaction structured as a reorganization was treated as a dividend
distribution, a result dictated by an inquiry into the substance of what was
actually accomplished. Curiously, it has become apparent that the doctrine is
more readily applied to recharacterize transactions involving closely-held cor-
porations. Apparently the presence of a broad base of public shareholders is
sufficient to enable the Service to conclude that the form of the transaction
is the product of arms-length bargaining and should therefore be respected.2
Thus, the doctrine of substance over form is one that has become almost ex-
clusively identified with closely-held businesses.
A particular manifestation of the principle that has found widespread appli-
cation in the Subchapter C arena is the step-transaction doctrine. This doc-
trine provides for the integration of a series of purportedly separate steps into
a unified transaction. Although this rule is deceptively easy to state, and is an
eminently sensible application of the substantive approach to the evaluation
of tax consequences, the circumstances in which amalgamation is appropriate
have varied depending upon the particular set of facts presented.
In this regard, it is generally conceded that the doctrine can apply if any
of three alternative tests are met: the "end result" test, the "mutual inter-
dependence" test, or the more restrictive "binding commitment" test. Under
*M.B.A., St. John's University, 1972; B.S., American University 1969. Robert Willens is a Certified Public
Accountant and Tax Partner in the New York office of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Mr. Willens has
authored numerious articles and is a frequent lecturer on the tax aspects of corporate-shareholder
relationships.
'293 U.S. 465 (1935).
2See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-551, 1973-2 C.B. 112 wherein a sale of property to a shareholder pursuant to
a Section 337 liquidation was respected where the sale was approved by the entity's shareholders who
owned a substantial portion of the shares entitled to vote.
[125]
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the end result approach to amalgamation, a series of steps will be telescoped
if they were taken for the purpose of achieving a result sought by the participants
at the outset. The mutual interdependence test will result in integration only
on a finding that the steps were so interdependent that the legal relations created
by the initial step would have been fruitless without a completion of the series.
Finally, the binding commitment test mandates amalgamation only if a legally
enforceable obligation to complete the series was in place at the inception of
the transaction.
Notwithstanding the relative objectivity of the foregoing rules, both the
Service and courts have had difficulty in determining which test to apply to
the particular transaction under scrutiny. It has become clear that the applica-
tion of each test will vary depending upon the particular section of the Code
being evaluated.' The confusion thus generated is further compounded by failure
to consistently apply the same step-transaction test to a particular Code sec-
tion. Nevertheless, recent applications of the doctrine seem to embrace the prin-
ciple that each of the provisions of Subchapter C can be linked with one of
the three alternative step-transaction tests. This thesis will be demonstrated
through a review of decisions dealing with Section 302 which relates to redemp-
tions; Section 351 which deals with corporate organization; Section 368 which
governs corporate reorganizations; and finally, the "integrated transaction"
doctrine under which a liquidation-reincorporation may be treated as either
a reorganization or a purchase of assets by the reincorporated entity.
I. REDEMPTIONS: THE "ZENZ" DOCTRINE
The tax consequences of a stock redemption, an acquisition by a corpora-
tion of its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property,' are governed
by Section 302. If the transaction satisfies any of the tests enumerated within
Section 302(b), the redemption proceeds are treated as received in exchange
for the stock and are therefore eligible for capital gain treatment.' A failure
to satisfy these tests invokes the rule of Section 302(d), and the proceeds are
treated as a distribution to which Section 301 applies.
Under Section 302(b)(1) exchange treatment is available if the redemp-
tion is not "essentially equivalent to a dividend." 6 In United States v. Davis,
the Supreme Court held that dividend equivalence can be avoided only if the
'This thesis was articulated in a landmark article dealing with the doctrine. Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions
in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 PROC. N.Y.U. INST. FED TAX'N 247 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Mintz
& Plumb].
'I.R.C. § 317(b). All subsequent references to sections are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended,
unless otherwise indicated.
'The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 222(c)(1), 96 Stat. 478 (1982
[hereinafter cited as TEFRA] provides in new Section 302(b)(4) exchange treatment for a redemption
qualifying as a partial liquidation as defined in new Section 302(e). These redemptions are characterized
solely by what happens at the corporate level by reason of the assets distributed. TEFRA § 222(c)(2),
96 Stat. 479 (1982).
'I.R.C. § 302(b)(1).
'397 U.S. 301 (1970), reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970).
[Vol. I
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redemption results in a "meaningful reduction" in the shareholder's propor-
tionate interest in the corporation.' Section 302(b)(2) provides exchange treat-
ment for a redemption that is "substantially disproportionate" with respect
to the shareholder.' A redemption is substantially dispropionate if, after the
application of the attribution rules of Section 318,10 the taxpayer has experienced
a greater than 20% reduction in his percentage ownership of both voting and
nonvoting common stock. ' Finally, Section 302(b)(3) is applicable in cases where
the redemption results in a complete termination of the taxpayer's stock in-
terest in the redeeming corporation.' 2 For purposes of determining whether
a complete termination has occurred, Section 302(c)(2) provides that if certain
conditions are met, the constructive ownership rules that attribute stock be-
tween family members may be waived. 3
On the theory that the consequences of a stock redemption are principal-
ly governed by the effect of the transaction on the quantum of a shareholder's
stock ownership, a question arises as to whether non-redemption transactions
with respect to the corporate stock may properly be taken into account in testing
the redemption. If this inquiry is answered affirmatively, a further question
as to when such a transaction is sufficiently related to the redemption must
also be evaluated in the crucible of the step-transaction doctrine.
In Zenz v. Quinfivan4 a taxpayer disposed of her entire interest in a cor-
poration by means of a sale of shares to a third party followed by a redemp-
tion of the balance. The Service contended that the steps should be reversed
and that the redemption should be taxed as a dividend. 5 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the redemption element of the tran-
saction could not be examined as a separate transaction. 6 It ruled that the
predecessor of Section 302(b)(3) applied, as the integrated series of steps resulted
in a complete termination of the taxpayer's interest in the corporation. Accor-
dingly, dividend treatment under Section 115(g) of.the 1939 Code was not
imposed. 7
1Id. at 313. The IRS has issued several rulings defining the boundaries of these terms. See e.g., Rev. Rul.
75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111.
'I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(A).
"I.R.C. § 318.
"I.R.C. § 302(b)(2). The requisite reduction can exist on the basis of a redemption of stock which is
constructively owned by the taxpayer. Rev. Rul. 77-237, 1977-2 C.B. 88. Moreover, a failure to reduce
common ownership does not preclude Section 302(b)(2) treatment where the shareholder owns only voting
preferred. Rev. Rul. 81-41, 1981-1 C.B. 121.
'
2I.R.C. § 302(b)(3).
"I.R.C. § 302(c)(2). These conditions are depected in Section 302(c)(2)(A) and are activated by a shareholder's
non-retention of an "interest" in the corporation for a ten-year period following the redemption coupled
with the filing of an agreement to notify the Service of a reacquisition of an interest within the prescribed
period. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A). The term "interest" has been expansively defined. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-556,
1956-2 C.B. 177.
"213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
"1106 F. Supp. 57, 60 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
16213 F.2d at 917.
17Id.
19831
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The Zenz decision firmly established the principle that the consequences
of a redemption could be affected by related transactions. In Rev. Rul. 55-745"8
the Service agreed to follow Zenz, and in Rev. Rul. 75-44719 extended the Zenz
principle to redemptions intended to qualify under Section 302(b)(2). In this
latter ruling the Service concluded that where a redemption is accompanied
by a sale or an issuance of shares, and where both events are clearly part of
an integrated plan to reduce stock ownership, effect will be given to the overall
result for purposes of Section 302(b)(2).11 Conspicuously absent, however, from
the Service's concession regarding Zenz is a statement as to the particular step-
transaction test that must be met for purposes of characterizing the series of
steps as events that are "clearly part of an integrated plan to reduce a
shareholder's interest . "... ' It is here that the recent decisions provide
guidance.
A. Integrating Steps
Based upon the language of Rev. Rul. 75-447, it appears that the Service
employs a variant of the end-result test of the step-transaction doctine in the
redemption area. In view of the fact that the end-result test is the least restric-
tive step-transaction standard, a bias in favor of integration is readily discer-
nable. Nevertheless, the end-result test is often modified to require written
manifestations of a taxpayer's intentions yielding results that may vary from
those that would obtain through a "pure" application of the end-result
approach.
In Rickey v. United States" a 72% shareholder entered into an agreement
with the corporation to reduce his interest to less than 50%. This was achieved
by means of a redemption followed by a charitable contribution of a portion
of his stock. Since there was documentary evidence of a plan to reduce owner-
ship, the end-result test was satisfied, and the redemption qualified under Sec-
tion 302(b)(2).23 If the redemption had been evaluated as a separate transaction,
the reduction of the shareholder's interest would not have satisfied the dic-
tates of the statute. Similarly, in McDonald v. Commissioner"4 a written plan
of reorganization envisaged a redemption of a sole shareholder's preferred stock
coupled with an exchange of his common in return for voting stock of a publicly-
held corporation. This plan was designed to qualify as a reorganization under
Section 368(a)(1)(B). Although the Service initially argued that the redemp-
tion should be tested separately, the Tax Court found that both steps were em-
bodied in the written plan of reorganization and under the principles of Zenz
"Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223.
"Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113.
2d.
"Id. at 114.
22427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La. 1977).
111d. at 492.
2452 T.C. 82 (1969).
[Vol. I
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should be treated as a single transaction.25 On this basis, the overall result caused
a substantial change in the taxpayer's interest sufficient to qualify the redemp-
tion as an exchange.
Notwithstanding the general acceptance of the end-result test in the redemp-
tion area, the additional requirement that the taxpayer's intentions be
documented has served to restrict the wholesale adoption of the test. In
Niedermeyer v. Commissioner26 a redemption of a taxpayer's common stock
was followed three months later by a charitable gift of his preferred stock.
The court refused to integrate the steps even though the temporal proximity
of the events indicated that the intent to make the gift was present at the time
of redemption. The court concluded that single transaction status would be
conditioned on a showing that a "firm and fixed" plan existed." Since the
taxpayer's intentions were neither documented nor communicated to others,
the decision to contribute his preferrred stock could have been rescinded. The
discretionary nature of the steps sought to be integrated was sufficient to render
them separate transactions for purposes of evaluating their tax consquences. s
A similar approach was employed to thwart the desired tax treatment in
Paparo v. Commissioner.2 9 In that case the redemption deemed as such by Sec-
tion 30430 was not stepped together with the public offering of the redeeming
entity's stock. Even though the redemption was undertaken for the sole pur-
pose of facilitating the public offering, the result which the parties intended
from the outset, the absence of an "overall financial plan" and an express
agreement between the corporation and the underwriters regarding the timing
and magnitude of the offering was sufficient to render the modified end-result
test inapplicable. 3' The redemption, viewed as a separate and independent tran-
saction, was taxed as a dividend.32
B. The Service Deviates
In keeping with the thesis that the application of step-transaction prin-
ciples is not always a model of uniformity, the Service has strayed from a strict
211d. at 87-88. The Service later conceded that single-transaction status wis indeed appropriate, but this
concession was prompted by its desire to classify the exchange element of the transaction as one involving
consideration not permitted in a "B" reorganization. Rev. Rul. 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110.
2662 T.C. 280 (1974), aff'dper curium, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
"162 T.C. at 291.
23Id.
"671 T.C. 692 (1979).
"I.R.C. § 304(a)(1). Section 304(a)(I) treats an acquisition by one corporation of stock in another where
both are controlled by the selling persons as a distribution in redemption of the stock of the acquiring
entity. Id.
1171 T.C. at 704-05.
3"The "steppability" of public offerings has generated its own unique body of law. Due to the unpredictability
of the public's response to the offer it is generally viewed as a separate transaction. See, e.g., Dunlap
and Associates, Inc. v. Comm'r. 47 T.C. 542 (1967) (reincorporation not amalgamated with offering for
the purpose of disqualifying a reorganization under Section 368(a)(1)(F).
1983]
5
Willens: The Step-Transaction Doctrine in Subchapter C
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983 6
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 1 [1983], Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.u kron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol1/iss1/6
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
adherence to the requirements of case law. In Rev. Rul. 77-22611 a corporate
shareholder surrendered stock in redemption and shortly thereafter sold the
balance of its holdings. The redemption was structured to flunk Section 302(b)
and yield dividend treatment so as to enable the shareholder to reap the benefits
of the 85% intercorporate dividends received deduction.34 The Service applied
the Zenz doctrine and treated the redemption and sale as a unit. The redemp-
tion, to the taxpayer's dismay, was taxed as an exchange. The ruling is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the decision in Niedermeyer, a case involving nearly iden-
tical facts. The infirmities which prompted the Niedermeyer decision, most
notably the absence of documentation and the discretionry nature of the second
step disposition, were equally present in the ruling. Nevertheless, the step-
transaction doctrine was applied in the latter but not in the former. This result
is contrary to the goal of achieving certainty and predictability of our tax laws.
A similar degree of opportunism is present in the conclusions expressed
by the Service in Rev. Rul. 75-83.11 The issue involved the taxation of boot
received in an acquisitive reorganization.3 6 Although the Service gratuitously
agreed that the dividend equivalance of boot is tested under Section 302 prin-
ciples, it chose to treat the redemption as one which occurred prior to and
separate from the reorganization. This result, flies in the face of the Zenz doc-
trine and is in direct conflict with the rationale of McDonald. The McDonald
court tested a pre-reorganization redemption by giving effect to the overall result
that was achieved.3 This was supported by evidence of a written plan of
reorganization which unmistakably encompassed each of the steps. Although
a similar set of facts was present in Rev. Rul. 75-83, the Service has chosen
to ignore the rightful application of the step-doctrine for the purpose of achieving
a beneficial tax result.3 8
C. Series of Redemptions
While the end-result test is generally applicable in the redemption-
disposition arena, the binding commitment branch of the step-transaction doc-
trine is the order of the day when a taxpayer seeks to integrate a series of redemp-
tions. In the absence of integration, each redemption is tested separately against
the standards set forth in Section 302(b).
Where a series of redemptions is undertaken, the parties must establish
that a "firm and fixed" plan to achieve a particular result is present. Generally,
"Rev. Rul. 77-226, 1977-2 C.B. 90.
"I.R.C. § 243(a)(1).
"Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
"'Where property other than that permitted by Section 354(a)(1) is received in a reorganization, the gain
realized is recognized in an amount not exceeding the value of such "boot." I.R.C. § 356(a)(1). If the
exchange has the effect of a dividend, the gain is taxable as such to the extent of the shareholder's ratable
share of earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2).
"See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
"Step-transaction principles were employed to analyze the character of boot in Wright v. United States,
482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 1
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a firm plan with fixed conditions can be evidenced only by a written agree-
ment creating bilateral obligations to redeem a particular amount of stock at
specified intervals. In the case of corporations owned by members of a family,
the courts have assiduously applied these requisites to deny single transaction
status. In the context of closely-held corporations owned by unrelated
shareholders, the standards for finding a firm and fixed plan are not applied
quite as vigorously.
Thus, in Benjamin v. Commissioner39 a plan to terminate a family mem-
ber's stock interest through a series of redemptions was found not to be firm
and fixed due to the absence of a common understanding as to the "time or
procedure" for effecting the transactions.4" Similarly, in Johnston v.
Commisioner4' separate transaction status was found notwithstanding the
existence of a written agreement which created a binding obligation of annual
redemptions culminating in an elimination of the taxpayer's interest. Although
the obligations were binding, the taxpayer elected not to enforce her rights in
several years in which the corporation failed to redeem her shares. Thus, in
cases where an agreement to redeem is not enforced, and where owners of the
entity are family members, the obligations created will hot give rise to integra-
tion treatment.4 2
The presence of unrelated shareholders or the existence of conditions im-
posed by a third party has resulted in a relaxation of the standards normally
required for amalgamation. For example, in Bleily & Collishaw, Inc. v.
Commissioner 3 a single transaction was found notwithstanding the absence
of a written agreement. Since the shareholders of the redeeming entity were
unrelated, and since the alacrity with which the redemptions were effected clearly
indicated that a complete termination of interest was intended, the tests typically
applied when testing for a firm and fixed plan were eschewed. Similarly, in
Roebling v. Commissioner44 a plan for the periodic redemption of a taxpayer's
preferred stock in a bank was subject to the approval of regulatory authorities.
Although each redemption was conditioned upon the maintenance of certain
levels of working capital, the court found that the plan was as firm and fixed
as a bank could legally construct. On this basis, the court concluded that the
rigidity required in a family-held setting was unnecessary and the realities of
3166 T.C. 1084 (1976), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979).
4166 T.C. at 1113.
4-77 T.C. 679 (1981).
"The use of the binding commitment test is not surprising. It is often adopted in cases where the steps
sought to be integrated span several years. In the absence of assurances that the series will be completed,
tax consequences can remain "open" in contravention of the dictates of our annual accounting system.
See Comm'r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
"372 T.C. 751 (1979), aff'd, No. 79-7601, unpubl. op. (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 1981).
4477 T.C. 30 (1981).
1983]
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the environment in which the corporation operated mandated a decision in its
favor."5
As these decisions demonstrate, the standards for amalgamating a series
of redemptions are fluid. Although a strict application of the binding commit-
ment test almost certainly applies in the context of a family corporation,
the courts have shown a welcome degree of flexibility in cases where mitigating
circumstances exist to warrant a deviation from all of the rigors of this most
restrictive of the step-transaction tests.
D. The Corning Transaction
A fascinating practical application of the step-transaction doctrine involves
the divestiture being engineered by Corning Glass Works of its stock in Owens-
Corning Fiberglass.46 Pursuant to an antitrust decree, Corning must dispose
of at least 900/0 of its interest in Owens. It will accomplish this result through
a redemption coupled with the issuance of 25-year debentures that are conver-
tible into its Owens stock. In light of the court decree it would appear that
the conditions precedent to the application of Zenz are present. The redemp-
tion should be tested by taking into account the overall result accomplished
by both the redemption and the debenture conversion. Nevertheless, the ex-
tent of the reduction in the taxpayer's interest will theoretically remain "open"
for up to twenty-five years pending the eventual redemption or conversion of
the debentures. One wonders whether the Service will balk at what appears
to be a classic step-transaction case due to the attenuated period within which
the steps are to be consummated."
II. THE STEP-TRANSACTION DOCTRINE AND SECTION 351
Section 351 of the Code governs the tax treatment of corporate organiza-
tions. It provides for non-recognition treatment where property is transferred
to a corporation by one or more persons, solely in exchange for stock or
securities, if the transferors are in control of the corporation immediately after
the transfer." For this purpose, control is defined as the ownership of stock
possessing 8007o of the total combined voting power and 80% of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock.4
9
In the Section 351 area, the step-transaction issue most often encountered
involves the effect of subsequent dispositions of stock by the transferors on
the "control immediately after" requirement. If the disposition is properly in-
tegrated with the transfer, the control test is applied after the disposition is
made. If, however, the disposition is a separate transaction, the requirements
"Id. at 55.
"CORNING GLASS WORKS, INC., PROSPECTUS (Nov. 30, 1982).
"See supra note 42.
"I.R.C. § 351(a).
"I.R.C. § 368(c). The Service has ruled that ownership of 80% of the total number of shares of each
class of non-voting stock is required. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
[Vol. I
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of Section 351 are applied by reference to the percentage of ownership existing
the moment the transferors initially obtain the corporate stock.
In response to the implications of the phrase "immediately after", the
courts have been chary in applying the step-transaction doctrine in this area.
As a result, it is generally agreed that a disposition Will only be integrated with
a transfer if the steps are found to be mutually interdependent or they are under-
taken pursuant to a binding agreement in existence at the time of the exchange.
Thus, in what is perhaps the most celebrated step-transaction case,
American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner,"° the property transferors agreed
to transfer stock to an underwriter if the latter was successful in marketing
an issue of preferred stock. The underwriter succeeded and stock sufficient
to deprive the transferors of statutory control was ultimately conveyed. Although
the incorporation, marketing of preferred stock, and conveyance to the under-
writers were steps which were taken pursuant to an integrated plan, the court
concluded that the absence of mutual interdependence was probative with regard
to their status as separate transactions." Although the issuance of preferred
was intended from the outset, the issuance was not an indispensable step without
which no other step would have been taken. Since the incorporati6n step was
not conditioned on the issuance, the legal relations created thereby would not
have-been fruitless without a completion of the series.
This approach to integration has remained the standard throughout the
evolution of Section 351. In Intermountain Lumber Co. & Subsidiaries v.
Commissioner2 Section 351 was held inapplicable over the Service's objections
in a case in which the incorporator had entered into a pre-exchange agreement
to dispose of 50% of his stock in the transferee. The inapplicability of Section
351 yielded a fair market value rather than carryover basis for the assets that
were obtained. Notwithstanding its expedient litigating position in Intermoun-
tain, the Service's rulings have also generally adopted the principle of American
Bantam Car."5 In Rev. Rul. 79-70, 5 the Service applied the step doctrine to
oust Section 351 of application in a case in which the incorporation would not
have occurred but for the agreement of a buyer to purchase 40%Vo of the incor-
5
s11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
SI11 T.C. at 406.
65 T.C. 1025 (1976). See also Rev. Rul. 83-23, 1983-5 I.R.B. 9, where a binding obligation to dispose
of stock was taken into account in determining whether a United States shareholder received stock of
azcontrolled foreign corporation in a Section 355 distribution. Since the recipient was obligated to dispose
of the stock, holding it pursuant to a binding obligation was considered to be transitory, and as a result,
the shareholder was required to include the value in gross income pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 7.367(b)-10(i)(2),
T.D. 7530, 1978-1 C.B. 92, 109.
"But see Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73 (a disposition pursuant to a mere plan or intention violates
control based primarily on consideration of fiscal policy rather than consistent application of tax principles).
"Rev. Rul. 79-70, 1979-1 C.B. 144. Compare Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145, which illustrates the
effects of an integrated sale where the buyer is a co-transferor. A buyer's status as such will be disregarded,
however, where the stock received from the corporation is obtained in exchange for property of a "relatively
small value."
1983]
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porator's stock. On the other hand, in Rev. Rul. 78-294"1 a disposition of stock
by an underwriter pursuant to a "firm commitment" was not integrated with
an incorporation even though such disposition was planned since the under-
writer assumed the risk of reselling and thereby could be forced to retain a
portion of the stock for a long time. Finally, in an exhaustive exegesis of its
approach to Section 351 presented in a recent Technical Advice Memorandum,
the Service declined to step together a Section 351 exchange that was followed
by a gift of all of the transferee's stock. 6 Although the existence of a pre-
arranged plan to dispose of the stock could easily be inferred from the timing
of the steps, the fact that the transferors had the legal right to keep the stock
indicated that the steps were not mutually interdependent, therefore, not sub-
ject to amalgamation."
Accordingly, the application of the step-transaction doctrine to the issue
of "control immediately after" is relatively well-settled. A less restrictive
approach has been sanctioned in determining the "steppability" of a disposi-
tion of stock following a reorganization under Section 368 analysis. If the ap-
proach approved under Section 368 were employed in circumstances governed
by Section 351, the relative certainty that has characterized the corporate
organization area could be thrown into turmoil. A graphic example involves
the recent creation of Energetics, a company formed to receive limited part-
nership interests in oil programs."8 As a sweetener, Energetics granted registration
rights to the incorporators and permitted them to sell their shares for up to
a year following the exchange. In the reorganization area, sales pursuant to
registration rights are often stepped together with the reorganization exchange
for the purpose of finding a lack of continuity of interest. 9 If this principle
were applied to the Energetics exchange, the control requisite to Section 351
might be found to be lacking. The Service's capricious application of the step
doctrine in other areas makes such an expansion of the doctrine something
more than a theoretical possibility.
III. STOCK PURCHASES AS ASSET PPURCHASES:
THE KIMBELL-DIAMOND APPROACH
One of the best known manifestations of the step-transaction concept is
the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine. In Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v.
Commissioner60 one corporation purchased the stock of another for the pur-
"Rev. Rul. 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141.
"Ltr. Rul. 8220002, Dec. 31, 1981. See also Ltr. Rul. 8248015, Aug. 25, 1982.
"This parallels the rationale of a celebrated exchange/gift decision. Wilgard Realty Co., Inc. v. Comm'r,
127 F.2d 514 (2nd Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 655 (1942).
"Energetics Add Sweetner, CORP. FINANCING WEEK, Nov. 29, 1982, at 4.
"The presence of registration rights may make a disposition pursuant thereto mutually interdependent
with the receipt of the stock. McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois, Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.
1982). A finding of interdependence is sufficient for step-transaction purposes in the context of Section 351.
--14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
[Vol. IAKRON TAX JOURNAL
10
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 1 [1983], Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol1/iss1/6 1
Willens: The Step-Transaction Doctrine in Subchapter C
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
THE STEP-TRANSACTION DOCTRINE IN SUBCHAPTER C
pose of obtaining specific assets of the target through a prompt and prearranged
liquidation. The court invoked the "single transaction" doctrine and treated
the transaction as a purchase of assets, thus denying the buyer the right to car-
ryover the target's bases in the assets. The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine was a
rather unique application of step-transaction principles; it was based solely on
a finidng of the purchaser's unilateral intent to acquire assets. In response to
the difficulties inherent in demonstrating the requisite intent and to various
judicial inroads, 6' the doctrine was eventually codified as Section 334(b)(2) of
the 1954 Code.62 The codification, one of the few known attempts to legislate
the step doctrine, 63 was made applicable only to corporate purchasers of a
target's stock. As a result, noncorporate buyers remained subject to the
vicissitudes of Kimbell-Diamond. The recent revision of Section 334(b)(2)" and
its reincarnation as Section 33865 did nothing to redress this problem. Individual
purchasers of stock must satisfy the dictates of Kimbell-Diamond in order to
obtain asset purchase treatment for a stock acquistion that is followed by a
liquidation.
In this context, the most common scenario involves the potential applica-
tion of the step doctrine to a three-step transaction encompassing (1) a purchase
of stock, (2) a complete liquidation, and (3) a transfer of the assets to a newly-
created corporation. If each step is merely a component part of a single trans-
action, the net result yields a basis for the assets which is equal to their fair
market value. If the stock purchase is found to be separate from the latter steps,
the net effect is merely a reorganization under familiar liquidation-
reincorporation principles." This results in Newco inheriting the target's bases
in its assets67 and any assets not conveyed to Newco by the distributee
shareholders will be taxable as a dividend pursuant to Section 356(a)(2).1 s
In light of the fact that Kimbell-Diamond is activated only upon a con-
"United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1960). See also, John Simmons Co. v. Comm'r,
25 T.C. 635 (1955). These decisions struggled with the issue of whether Kimbell-Diamond was limited
to acquisitions of particular assets rather than going businesses.
6"I.R.C. § 334(b)(2), amended by TEFRA § 224(b), 96 Stat. 488-89 (1982).
"Another example is pre-TEFRA Section 31 l(d)(2)(A) in which a shareholder who had owned his stock
for at least one year would be given credence as a shareholder even in cases where the stock was purchased
for the purpose of tendering it for redemption. I.R.C. § 311(d)(2)(A), amended by TEFRA § 223(a)(1),
96 Stat. 483 (1982). But compare Rev. Rul. 80-221, 1980-2 C.B. 107 where the stock is purchased directly
from the corporation.
"4See supra note 62.
"I.R.C. § 338, repealed by TEFRA § 222(e)(4), 96 Stat. 480 (1982), reenacted as § 338, TEFRA § 224(a),
96 Stat. 485-88 (1982). The new Section 338 provides for asset-purchase treatment upon the filing of an
election within 75 days of the date on which a "qualifying stock purchase" is completed. An actual
liquidation is no longer required. Id. See generally, Willens & Decelles, The Subchapter C Provisions of
TEFRA, 13 TAX ADViSER 708 (1982).
"Typically the transaction is treated as a reorganization under Section 368(a)(1)(D), the most common
characterization of a liquidation-reincorporation. See e.g., James Armour, Inc. v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 295
(1964).
67I.R.C. § 362(b).
"See supra note 36.
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clusive showing of a unilateral intent to acquire assets, the courts have been
less than generous in allowing ill-advised taxpayers to belatedly achieve the
desired tax result. In Estate of Suter v. Commissioner,69 however, the intent
to acquire assets was shown to exist where the purchase, liquidation and transfer
to Newco all occurred within a period of little more than a month. Although
the Service asserted reorganization treatment, the court concluded that the pur-
chaser's ownership of the target's stock was transitory and should therefore
be disregarded. Since the sellers who were historic shareholders of the target
obtained no interest in Newco, the continuity of proprietary interest needed
to establish a reorganization did not exist.
In Griswold v. Commissioner,"0 however, asset purchase treatment was
denied in a case in which the stock purchase contract expressly prohibited a
liquidation. The court distinguished Suter wherein a supplemental agreement
between the parties permitted a later liquidation.7 In view of the contract terms,
the court in Griswold had little difficulty in finding that an intent to liquidate
did not exist from the outset. The stock purchase was a transaction separate
from the liquidation/reincorporation.
More recently, in Harold C. Lang" the infirmities of Griswold were
employed to deny a fair market value basis. In Lang a contract provision
precluded liquidation, or any other movement of assets, in the absence of the
seller's permission. In addition, there was a three-year hiatus between the stock
purchase and the commencement of the remaining steps. Although the con-
tract terms were not as restrictive as those that existed in Griswold, the unduly
long passage of time was determinative of the issue of whether a contem-
poraneous intent to acquire assets existed at the time the stock was purchased.
The court had little difficulty in finding for the the Service.
On the basis of these decisions, asset purchase treatment appears to be
uniquely within the control of the buyer. If the contract provisions are drafted
with care and the steps are expeditiously taken consistent with a preconceived
intent to obtain assets, the requirements of the step-transaction doctrine should
be readily satisfied. The Service generally agrees as evidenced by its reasoning
in Rev. Rul. 69-24211 in which a stock purchase followed by liquidation within
thirty days was treated as an asset purchase for purposes of Section 1033. Devia-
tion from established guidelines will have the effect of severing the stock pur-
chase and yielding reorganization treatment for the liquidation/reincorporation.
6'29 T.C. 244 (1957).
70400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Id. at 430.
"T.C.M. (P-H) j 82, 149 (1982).
"Rev. Rul. 69-242, 1969-1 C.B. 200.
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IV. THE STEP-TRANSACTION DOCTRINE IN SECTION 368:
THE CONCEPT OF A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
The most significant applications of the step-transaction doctrine have
populated the portion of Subchapter C that deals with the status of a trans-
action as a tax-free reorganization. The application of the doctrine in Section
368 is dominated by the concept of the "plan of reorganization." '74 All steps
that are taken pursuant to the plan are to be considered in evaluating the effect
of the integrated transaction.
Since the certification of "the plan" as the touchstone for the application
of the doctrine evokes notions of the end-result theory, a crucial question in-
volves the issue of whether the unilateral intentions of one party will be suffi-
cient, or whether a step will be integrated only if it is taken pursuant to the
bilateral plans or intentions of all participants.
The step doctrine in the area of reorganization, while admittedly based
upon the end-result theory, will only encompass steps taken pursuant to bilateral
plans or intentions. It is almost universally true that a step taken pursuant to
the unilateral desires of one participant will not be treated as part of the plan
of reorganization.5
A. Bilateral Intent
The foregoing rule is supported by numerious precedents. A graphic illus-
tration of the need for bilateral intent16 is presented by the contrasting deci-
sions in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Commissioner" and Campbell v. Com-
missioner."8 In Anheuser-Busch a reorganization was followed by a "drop-
down" of the acquired assets to the buyer's wholly-owned subsidiary. Although
the contract did not require this transfer, it expressly gave the buyer the right
to do so. The drop-down was construed as a step contemplated by the parties
and considered part of the plan of reorganization. Since the Amheuser-Busch
decision pre-dated the enactment of Section 368(a)(2)(C), the finding of in-
tegration was sufficient to deny reorganization statuts." In Campbell, the plan
evidenced by the contract did not raise the prospect of a drop-down. Con-
sequently, the conveyance to the acquiring corporation's subisdiary the day
after the acquisition was not considered part of the plan of reorganization.
74Mintz & Plumb, supra note 3, 273-74.
"But cf. King Enterprises Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969) in which an acquisition of
stock for stock and boot followed by a preplanned merger was taxed as an "A" reorganization. Although
based on unilateral intent, the decision can be rationalized as an application of Kimbell-Diamond precepts.
See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
76See Mintz & Plumb, supra note 3, at 276-77.
"40 B.T.A. 1100 (1939), aff'd, 115 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941).
"'15 T.C. 312 (1950).
7'Placint of assets in a "remote" subsidiary deprives a transaction of continuity of proprietary interest.
Groman v. Comm'r. 302 U.S. 82 (1937). But see I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(C). See also Rev. Rul. 64-73, 1964-1
C.B. 142.
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Other examples of the need for a mutuality of purpose abound. In Rev.
Rul. 56-345,1o a redemption occurring one month after a "C" reorganization
was treated as a separate transaction where the agreement and plan of
reorganization made no mention of the offer received by the target shareholders
that prompted them to surrender their shares for redemption. Since the ac-
quiring corporation had made no prior commitment in regard to the redemp-
tion, and was not even aware of the event which motivated it, the duality of
purpose needed for amalgamation did not exist. In Yoc Heating Corp. v.
Commissioners) a purchase of stock followed by a merger of the target into
a newly-created shell was viewed as a single transaction not qualifying as a
reorganization. The Service's attempt to separate the purchase from the merger
for the purpose of finding a continuity of proprietary interest was rejected.
Since the purchase contract specifically envisioned the formation of Newco,
both steps were considered as taken pursuant to the bilateral intentions of the
parties and were therefore ripe for integration. On this basis continuity did
not exist since the historic shareholders of target did not obtain a stock in-
terest in Newco.
In recognition of the fact that its proposed regulations endorsed an over-
ly broad step-transaction theory, the Service recently revised its final regula-
tions dealing with the continuity of business enterprise requirement for a
reorganization.82 Continuity of business exists if the transferee continues the
historic business of the transferor.8 3 The historic business is defined as the one
which the transferor most recently conducted other than one entered into as
part of a plan designed to achieve a reorganization." In one example describ-
ing this rule, the Service denied historic business status to an investment business
that had been conducted by the taxpayer for more than a three-year period
following the sale of its operating assets." This was true despite the fact that
such business was entered into prior to the time it had identified the entity into
which it ultimately merged. The final regulations correct this unduly ambitious
application of the step-transaction doctrine. 6 A business will now only be denied
historic status if it was entered into as part of the plan of reorganization. Use
of the phrase, "the plan of reorganization," should necessitate a showing of
bilateral intent. Unless the business was entered into pursuant to an agreement
to which the merger partner was a participant, it will be treated as the historic
'"Rev. Rul. 56-345, 1956-2 C.B. 206. See also Rev. Rul. 76-334, 1976-2 C.B. 108 in which the event that
prompted redemption was not considered part of the "agreement."
"61 T.C. 168 (1973).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1, T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134, 135-141.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(2), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134, 140.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(3)(iii), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134, 140.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5) (Example 3), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134, 140. The original version involved
identical facts but investment assets were purchased as part of an overall plan "intended to result in a
reorganization." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5) (Example 3), 44 Fed. Reg. 76,815 (1979). The final
version eliminates the quoted phrase and with it the unilateral implications subsumed therein. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.368-1(d)(5) (Example 3), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134, 140.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5) (Example 3), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134, 140.
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business for continuity of business purposes.
B. Post-Merger Continuity of Interest: The McDonald's Case
A statutory merger will only qualify as a reorganization if the doctrine
of continuity of proprietary interest is satisfied. Continuity exists if the
shareholders of the target maintain a proprietary interest in the entity to which
the target's assets are transferred. 7 Although the focus is generally on the
qualitative nature of the consideration initially received by the shareholders,
continuity of interest can also be affected by post-merger dispositions of stock.88
If the disposition and merger are treated as a unit under step-transaction prin-
ciples, the continuity test is properly applied to the interest ultimately retained
by target's historic owners. On the other hand, a failure to justify integration
would eliminate the disposition as a relevant consideration for continuity pur-
poses. In this context the decisions discussed above clearly indicate the
amalgamation is warranted only if the disposition is part of the plan of
reorganization, that is, if the disposition was effectuated pursuant to the bilateral
intentions of the participants.
In McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner9 the Tax Court found that a
post-merger sale of stock pursuant to a pre-merger intent to sell was a separate
transaction. The sellers did not want to become shareholders of McDonald's
and wanted only cash in return for their stock. McDonald's insisted on the
use of its stock so that it could enjoy the benefits of pooling of interest ac-
counting treatment. In order to satisfy the sellers, McDonald's promised to
include the seller's shares in a planned registration and underwriting. It also
granted the sellers demand registration rights should it fail to successfully struc-
ture an offering within one year of the merger. Such an offering was in fact
accomplished, and the target shareholders disposed of their newly acquired stock
within six months of the merger.
Despite this fact pattern, the Tax Court declined to amalgamate the steps.
This refusal was based on the view that the proper step-transaction test was
the one employed under Section 351, the mutual interdependence test.9" Since
there was no showing that the merger was conditioned on the subsequent disposi-
tion of the stock, and the sellers were not legally bound to dispose, the condi-
tions needed for amalgamation were not met. The decision was curious for
reasons other than the court's selection of the interdependence test. The Ser-
vice was placed in the unusual posture of arguing for a tax-free reorganization
in order to deny the buyer's a stepped-up basis for the target's assets.9 In so
'
7Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61, 200-201. See Also Helvering V. Minnesota Tea
Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
"See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67.
"76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
9076 T.C. at 997-98.
1176 T.C. at 988.
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doing, the Service's conception of the step doctrine seemed opportunistic. Under
"normal" circumstances, such as in the advance ruling area, the Service would
invoke the step doctrine merely on a showing that the disposition was pursuant
to a seller's pre-merger intent to sell.
92
It is apparent that both the Tax Court's approach" and the Service's ad-
vance ruling guidelines are patently violative of the accepted tests. The Tax
Court was unduly restrictive whereas the Service's approach was unjustifiably
broad. Neither the court nor the Service heeded the bilateral plan or intention
standard that is traditionally applied in the reorganization area.
C. The Seventh Circuit Reverses
Against this backdrop and in response to the welter of scholarly comment
criticizing the Tax Court's decision,9" the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court. 95 In so doing it restored the concept of bilateral plans
or intentions as the controlling theory for application of the step doctrine in
the reorganization area. It found that the granting by McDonald's of demand
registration rights was probative of the issue of whether the sale was part of
the transaction negotiated by the participants.96 This facilitation of the sale
by the buyer through the granting of such rights was sufficient to render it
an active participant to such sale. As the sale was therefore a step undertaken
pursuant to the bilateral actions of the participants, it was clearly part of the
plan of reorganization. McDonald's granting of demand registration rights was
analogized to the actions of the buyer in Heintz v. Commissioner,97 a case in
which a post-merger sale was also encompassed within the plan of reorganiza-
tion. In Heintz the buyer promised that the seller's stock would be sold in a
public offering. When the offering did not eventuate, the buyer arranged for
a private sale of the stock. These actions were sufficient to demonstrate that
the sale was part of the agreement between the parties and therefore part of
an overall plan.
At this juncture it is difficult to determine whether the mere presence of
demand registration rights will be sufficient to warrant integration, or whether
their existence in McDonald's was merely a shred of additional evidence sup-
porting a result otherwise dictated by the seller's unwavering intentions to "cash
out." The mere granting of such rights, without more, should not be accord-
"Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.02, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569.
"in addition to its "incorrect" adoption of mutual interdependence principles, the court added in dictum
that a unilateral intent to dispose might be sufficient to integrate a sale. 76 T.C. at 995 fn. 38 (citing Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Comm'r. 40 B.T.A. 1100, 1107 (1939) (a bilaterial intent case)). See supra note 77.
"See, e.g., Prusiecki, Continuity of Interest in Tax-Free Mergers: New Opportunities After McDonald's
of Zion, 55 J. TAX'N 378 (1981).
"McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'g 76 T.C. 972 (1981).
"The court correctly applied that the mutual interdependence test and found it satisfied, and found the
"spirit" of the binding obligation test also satisfied. 688 F.2d at 524-25. See supra note 60.
9"688 F.2d at 527 (citing Heintz v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 132 (1955), nonacq., 1958-2 C.B. 9).
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ed conclusive weight. This view is supported by the conclusions stated in Rev.
Rul. 67-275,98 wherein registration was undertaken for the purpose of promoting
"the orderly marketing of the acquiring corporation's stock." 99 The ruling im-
plies that registration should not per se violate continuity where a sale pur-
suant to those rights occurs shortly after the merger. According a preclusive
quality to the granting of rights would appear to penalize taxpayers whose stock
must be registered before it may be alienated. If the effects of a post-merger
sale are to be equitably evaluated, something more than mere registration must
be present.
However, the granting of demand registration rights, if coupled with other
factors, should be enough to find the degree of mutuality otherwise needed
to treat a step as a component part of the plan of reorganization. The Seventh
Circuit was correct in according significance to these rights and employing them
to find that the sale was part of the transaction. The facts elucidated by the
trial court demonstrated the existence of a settled and firm determination to
sell at the earliest opportunity. The fact that the rights exacted from the buyer
were of paramount importance to the sellers was sufficient to classify the sale
as a component part of the plan of reorganization. Integration resulted from
the "bargained-for" nature of this element of the agreement.
The McDonald's decision will also affect reorganizations of closely held
businesses. Although the factor of registration rights will not be present, their
absence will not free these entities from the rigors of the principle espoused
by the court. Instead, transactions involving privately held corporations will
be scrutinized for other objective indicia that a post-merger sale was part of
the plan or reorganization. In some cases, these indicia will be contained within
the terms of the stock, as in mandatory serial redemption features. In other
cases, the totality of circumstances, including pre-merger discussions and
understandings, not rising to the level of a binding commitment, will provide
the Service with the ammunition needed to integrate the merger exchange with
the disposition.
CONCLUSION
The step-transaction doctrine is a fact of tax life in the Subchapter C area.
What has become increasingly difficult is the identification of the appropriate
test, the satisfaction of which will invoke its principles. What is painfully clear,
however, is the view initially expressed by Mintz and Plumb that no universal
test for application of the doctrine exists. Instead, the circumstances necessary
for its application will vary depending upon the Code section and the nuances
of the statutory language being examined.' 0 Just as the phrase "control im-
9 Rev. Rul. 67-275, 1967-2 C.B. 142.
99Id.
'.See generally Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the Step-Transaction Doctrine, 60 TAx~s
970 (1982).
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mediately after" mandates a restrictive application of the doctrine, the con-
cept of the "plan of reorganization" or the ephemeral" integrated transaction
approach" of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine warrant a broader outlook.
Although the recent decisions bring us further along the path toward predict-
ability in the application of the alternative step-transaction tests, certain aber-
rant interpretations by the Service remind us that true certainty in this corner
of tax law has yet to be achieved.
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